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A. Introduction
I.

An Economic Approach to Private International Law

Two lawyers, three opinions – the frequent joke about the indeterminacy of the
law and the variety of individual views seems particularly apt for private
international law1. There is a discrepancy not only between the respective
approaches in the United States and in Europe2, but also between approaches
within each of these jurisdictions. In the United States, there is widespread
disappointment with the multitude of equally unsatisfactory methods proposed
by academics and judges3. In Europe, the clash between traditional conflict of
laws theory and the country-of-origin principle is equally unsettling4. At least
outsiders seem to agree that private international law does a poor job of leading
to good and predictable results.
Can law and economics bring more scientific, objective foundations to the
discipline of private international law? Some criticism of private international
law has always been economic in nature. The preference for forum law in the
United States is said to lead to inefficient forum shopping and plaintifffavouring laws; the traditional choice-of-law rules in Europe clash with the
economic ideal of a common market as promoted by the country-of-origin
principle. Nonetheless, economic analysis long all but ignored private
international law5. But recently, interest has risen sharply. There are now both
an entire book6 and an entire Course at the Hague Academy7 as well as
*
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1
This article uses the terms private international law and choice of law interchangeably.
Private international law has two advantages: First, it is the standard terminology in many
countries outside the United States. Second, and more importantly, it expresses more clearly
the conflict inherent in the discipline between a private law and an international law
conception.
2
Symeon C. Symeonides (ed.), Private International Law at the End of the 20th Century:
Progress or Regress? (1999).
3
William A. Reppy Jr., Eclecticism in Conflict of Laws: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?:
Mercer L. Rev. 34 (1983) 645; for an overview of different approaches, see Eugene F.
Scoles/Peter Hay/Patrick J. Borchers/Symeon C. Symeonides (eds.), Conflict of Laws (2004)
5-110.
4
Ralf Michaels, EU Law as Conflict of Laws?: J. Priv. Int’l L. (forthcoming).
5
Some ad hoc economic arguments have always been used by private international
lawyers. See for example Ludwig von Bar, Das Fremdenrecht und seine volkswirtschaftliche
Bedeutung (1893) 26 et seq. An early economic analysis is William F. Baxter, Choice of Law
and the Federal System: Stan. L. Rev. 16 (1963) 1; cf. Erin A. O’Hara/William H. Allen,
Second Generation Law and Economics of Conflict of Laws: Baxter’s Comparative Impairment and Beyond: Stan. L. Rev. 51 (1999) 1011.
6
Michael J. Whincop/Mary Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism in the Conflict of Laws (2001);
for reviews, see Richard Garnett, U. Melb. L. Rev. 26 (2002) 236; Megan Richardson, Policy
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contributions to two encyclopaedias8 and a considerable number of law review
articles9. Almost all of these are normative10 and efficiency-oriented11: they set
out to yield criteria for better, more efficient, conflict-of-laws norms.
Economics, one may hope, can bring the conclusiveness to the field that
doctrine could not. But alas, even a fleeting review of existing studies reveals a
discrepancy of views or economic approaches that mirrors the discrepancy in
the traditional private international law doctrine12. Some authors focus on
individual interests, others on state interests. Some authors emphasize formal
issues – predictability for parties, regulatory advantages for states – others
substantive issues – optimal incentives for parties, maximizing of governmental
interests. Some authors favour cooperation between states to overcome
versus Pragmatism? Some Economics of Conflict of Laws: Common Law World Review 31
(2002) 189; Michael J. Solimine, The Law and Economics of Conflict of Law: Am. L. & Econ.
Rev. 4 (2002) 208; Roberta Wertman, N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 35 (2003) 1160; Peter
Mankowski, RabelsZ 69 (2005) 175.
7
Horatia Muir Watt, Aspects économiques du droit international privé (Réflexions sur
l’impact de la globalization économique sur les fondements des conflits de lois et de
jurisdictions), Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de droit international de la Haye 307 (2004-I,
published 2005) 25-383.
8
Francesco Parisi/Larry E. Ribstein, Choice of Law, in: Peter Newman (ed.), The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Volume 1 (1998) 236; Erin A. O’Hara/
Francesco Parisi, Conflict of Laws, in: Peter Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law, Volume 1 (1998) 387; Erin O’Hara/Larry E. Ribstein, Conflict of
Laws and Choice of Law, in: Boudewijn Bouckaert/Gerrit de Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of
Law and Economics, Volume 5 (2000) 631-660, available at <http://encyclo.findlaw.com/
9600book.pdf>.
9
More recent foundational articles in the United States include the following: Michael J.
Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law: Ga. L. Rev. 24 (1989) 49;
Larry D. Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law: Colum. L. Rev. 90 (1990) 277; Joel P.
Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government Responsibility:
Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 26 (1994) 975; Lea Brilmayer, Maximizing State Policy Objectives, in
Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws (1995) 169-218; Erin O’Hara/Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to
Efficiency in Choice of Law: U. Chi. L. Rev. 67 (2000) 1151; Joel P. Trachtman, Economic
Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction: Va. J. Int’l L. 42 (2001) 1; Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of
Law: New Foundations: Geo. L. J. 90 (2002) 883. Two general articles on the economic
analysis from a non-US perspective are Kurt Siehr, Ökonomische Analyse des Internationalen
Privatrechts, in: Dieter Henrich (ed.), Festschrift für Karl Firsching (1985) 269; Horatia Muir
Watt, Law and Economics. Quel apport pour le droit international privé?, in: Gilles
Goubeaux/Yves Guyon/Christophe Jamin/Paul Lagarde/ Geneviève Viney/Jean Waline (eds.),
Le contrat au début du XXIème siècle – Etudes offertes à Jacques Ghestin (2001) 685.
10
For a positive analysis, see Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of
Law (supra note 9).
11
For criticism (and a promising alternative approach), see Christian Kirchner, An
Economic Analysis of Choice-of-Law and Choice-of-Forum Clauses, in this volume p. ***.
12
Richardson (supra note 6) 189-193 invokes “[t]he Myth of ‘The Economic Approach’ to
Law” and advocates a different economic paradigm for analysis of common law jurisdictions;
for her own approach, see Megan Richardson/Gillian Hadfield (eds.), The Second Wave of
Law and Economics (1999).
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regulatory prisoners’ dilemmas, others regulatory competition to overcome
national peculiarities. In short, the normative proposals from economics differ
as widely as those from traditional doctrine. Even after accounting for
differences in factual assumptions13, some normative differences in outcome
remain.
This article sets out to test whether different models lead to different
outcomes. If so, the formulation of the question and the model become
determinative factor for the answer; different answers given are merely the
consequence of different questions asked14. This leads to a hypothesis: the
different results within different economic models are congruent with the
different views within traditional doctrinal private international law, because
economic analysis replicates the differences in doctrinal conceptions of private
international law15. To this end, this article, rather unusually, makes arguments
in three economic models – a private law model, an international law model,
and a model combining the two. The hypothesis is that the debate whether
private international law is “private law” or (public) “international law” is
replicated in the economic analysis of private international law. Rather than
resolve problems of private international law, economic analysis reformulates
them. If this is so, the choice of one model over another cannot be justified in
passing in a short introduction, as is the case in many economic analyses;
rather, this choice and its justification must be central to an economic analysis.
The subject area for this analysis is private international law of torts, more
specifically the question of the law applicable to cross-border torts. Tort law is
interesting for an economic analysis of private international law for various
reasons. First, no area of private international law has seen more turmoil and
change than the law of torts, and few areas rest on less stable foundations
today16. Second, tort law stands on the borderline between (public) regulatory
interests of states and (private) individual interests in private ordering17; it is
13

The importance of empirical studies (albeit limited to actual behaviour of judges,
lawyers, and litigants) to back up analyses is emphasized by Solimine, The Law and Economics of Conflict of Laws (supra note 6) 218 et seq.
14
Similarly Kirchner (supra note 11) ***: “The methodological approach chosen is a
decisive factor for analysing issues of conflict of laws”.
15
For a study of a similar case of interdisciplinary replication (between International Law
and International Relations), see Ed Morgan, International Law in the Interdisciplinary Mirror:
Am. J. Int’l Law 94 (2000) 595.
16
For US law, see only Scoles/Hay/Borchers/Symeonides (supra note 3) 69-74; for
American views of European reform proposals, see Symeon Symeonides, Tort Conflicts and
Rome II: A View from Across, in: Heinz-Peter Mansel/Thomas Pfeiffer/Herbert Kronke/
Christian Kohler/Rainer Hausmann (eds.), Festschrift Jayme, Volume II (2004) 935; Russell J.
Weintraub, Rome II and the Tension Between Predictability and Flexibility, in: Hans-Eric
Rasmussen-Bonne/Richard Freer/Wolfgang Lüke/Wolfgang Weitnauer (eds.), Balancing of
Interests – Liber Amicorum Peter Hay zum70. Geburtstag (2005) 451.
17
Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise: Tex. L. Rev. 38 (1959-1960) 1, 257;
Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering: St. Louis U. L. J. 35 (1991) 623; John C.P.
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therefore an excellent testing case for the hypothesis that economic analyses of
private international law are placed at an unsure position between these two
sub-disciplines. Finally, party autonomy, a favourite “catch-all” solution in law
and economics, has a necessarily reduced role to play in the area of tort law
(although an economic analysis may well suggest broader applications than
those currently accepted by doctrine)18.
Methodologically, this article’s focus is on efficiency, despite the intrinsic
problems with that concept as a normative goal19. The simple reason is that
efficiency is the focus of most other existing studies on the economics of
private international law. Private international law norms act as independent
variables in this analysis; a positive analysis of the development of these norms
is beyond this article20. Some simplifying assumptions are used. First, this
article disregards questions of jurisdiction and of forum shopping for more
favourable laws. Second, it assumes that the substantive laws of states are not
openly discriminatory against foreigners21. Third, normative implications are
such as to guide a hypothetical global legislator passing private international
law norms – a counterfactual institution on the global scene, but a realistic
possibility in the European Union and at least a possibility within the United
States. Finally, a general caveat is in order: although the analysis is detailed,
the point is to provide plausible economic considerations rather than fullfledged, abstract economic models. As a consequence, the economic arguments
made here, like those of other authors in the field, are non-formal and
methodologically somewhat eclectic.

Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the Rest of Us): Private Law in Disguise:
Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 28 (2004) 3.
18
Whincop/Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism (supra note 6) 78-79; O’Hara/Ribstein, From
Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1210.
19
Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency: Hofstra L. Rev. 8 (1980) 641; Duncan
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique: Stan. L. Rev. 33 (1981)
387.
20
For positive analysis of the development of private international law, see Solimine, An
Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law (supra note 9) (arguing that interest
analysis enables states and interest groups to incorporate more plaintiff-friendly and forumcitizen-friendly laws); see also Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law
Theory: U. Pa. L. Rev. 142 (1994) 949 (arguing that judges will ignore choice-of-law
approaches and instead focus on substantive considerations in deciding cases).
21
See Guzman (supra note 9) 927-930; Dieter Schmidtchen/Roland Kirstein/Alexander
Neunzig, Conflict of Law Rules and International Trade – A Transaction Costs Approach:
University of the Saarland, Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Discussion Paper
2004-01, 25, available at <http://www.uni-saarland.de/fak1/fr12/csle/publications/200401_conflict.pdf>.
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II. Private International Law: Private or International?
Private international law has traditionally been hard to situate between private
law on the one hand and (public) international law on the other22. European
laws, at least since Friedrich Carl von Savigny23, have been dominated by a
private law conception24. A brief flirtation with more public law-inspired
approaches in the 1970s25 has, on this level, been largely ineffective. This conception of private international law is not “merely formalist”, as opponents
sometimes claim; Europe has its own kind of “interest analysis”26. But the
interests that are analysed are largely individual interests27. State interests in
substantive policies are relatively unimportant.
22

Nikitas Hatzimihail, Pre-Classical Conflict of Laws (S.J.D. Thesis, Harvard, 2002) 113
et seq.; Miguel Virgós Soriano/Francisco J. Garcimartín Alférez, Estado de origen v. estado de
destino – Las diferentes lógicas del Derecho internacional privado: InDret 4/2004 (No. 251) 2,
available at <http://www.indret.com/pdf/251_es.pdf>; Horatia Muir Watt, Droit public et droit
privé dans les rapports internationaux (Vers la publicisation des conflits de lois?): Archives de
philosophie de droit 41 (1997) 207; Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization:
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 40 (2002) 209; Ian Mills, The Private History of International Law:
Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 55 (2006) 1.
23
Ralf Michaels, Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny’s Private International Law
and the Challenge of Europeanization and Globalization: Duke Law School Legal Studies
Paper No. 74 (September 2005), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=796228>. For other
analyses of Savigny’s approach to conflict of laws in English, see Gerhard Kegel, Story and
Savigny: Am. J. Comp. L. 37 (1989) 39; Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s Triumph? Choice of
Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century: Va. J. Int’l L. 39 (1999) 571;
Paul Volken, How Common are the General Principles of Private International Law? America
and Europe Compared: Yb. Priv. Int’l L. I (1999) 85; Hatzimihail (supra note 22) 40 et seq.
and passim; Mills (supra note 22) 34-37.
24
Gerhard Kegel/Klaus Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht (2004) 23-24 (§ 1 IV).
25
E.g. Christian Joerges, Die klassische Konzeption des Internationalen Privatrechts und
das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs: RabelsZ 36 (1972) 421; for criticism see Kegel/
Schurig (supra note 24) 202 (§ 3 XI c); cf. also Staudinger (-Sturm/Sturm), Kommentar zum
BGB (2003) Einl zum IPR, No. 31-53. But see, recently, Günther Kühne, Die Entsavignysierung des Internationalen Privatrechts insbesondere durch sog. Eingriffsnormen, in: Stephan
Lorenz/Alexander Trunk/Horst Eidenmüller/Christiane Wendehorst/Johannes Adolff (eds.),
Festschrift für Andreas Heldrich (2005) 815. The situation is different in European private
international law; see Ralf Michaels/Hans-Georg Kamann, Grundlagen eines allgemeinen
gemeinschaftlichen Richtlinienkollisionsrechts – “Amerikanisierung” des Gemeinschafts-IPR?:
Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 12 (2001) 301 (for relations with third states);
Michaels, EU Law as Conflict of Laws (supra note 4) (for relations between member states).
26
The foundational article is Gerhard Kegel, Begriffs- und Interessenjurisprudenz im
Internationalen Privatrecht, in: Max Gerwig/August Simonius/Karl Spiro/Theodor Süss/Ernst
Wolff (eds.) Festschrift Hans Lewald (1953) 259-288. See also Kegel, The “Crisis” of Conflict
of Laws: Recuel des Cours 112 (1964-II) 91-268; Klaus Schurig, Kollisionsnorm und
Sachrecht (1980).
27
Kegel/Schurig (supra note 24) 134-145 (§ 2 II); Christian von Bar/Peter Mankowski,
Internationales Privatrecht (2003) 9 (§ 1 No. 12); Axel Flessner, Interessenjurisprudenz im IPR
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The situation is different in the United States, where private international
law traditionally focuses on the conflict of laws as the conflict of sovereigns
who want their own laws to be applied. This is an international law conception,
focusing on the interests of states or governments. The ground for applying
foreign law is frequently comity, an obscurely antiquated kind of politeness that
one sovereign accords another sovereign28. The most important criterion to
determine the applicable law is the governmental interest in having one’s own
laws applied.
Of course, real world approaches to conflict of laws are neither fully private
nor fully international. Three relations can be distinguished: overlap, compromise, sublation. First, there is an occasional overlap between “private” and
“state” interests. Sometimes, private and international models suggest similar
solutions, because the relevant considerations can be seen as private and state
interests at the same time. For example, Gerhard Kegel and Klaus Schurig
argue that the “interest in order” (Ordnungsinteresse), in consistent application
of law, is an interest both of the state and of individuals29. When this consideration is determinative, both private and international law conceptions of
private international law reach similar results.
Second, the divergence between models does not necessitate a strict
dichotomy of actual private international law methods. Real-world methods are
compromises; even predominantly private or predominantly international
conceptions allow for other interests as exceptions. Thus in German private
international law, state interests do play a role, even if that role is limited30. In
particular, the theory of internationally mandatory laws has a strongly international/public law flavour. On the other hand, most approaches in the United
States do not follow a purely governmental interest approach, but allow also for
the consideration of private interests. For example, the Second Restatement31,
provides an eclectic mixture of public and private concerns with no clear
guidelines for their relative weight32; despite (or because of) this eclecticism, it
dominates the judicial landscape today.
(1990) (cf. the criticism by Klaus Schurig, Interessenjurisprudenz contra Interessenjurisprudenz im IPR – Anmerkungen zu Flessners Thesen: RabelsZ 59 (1995) 229).
28
For its history, see Hessel Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, in: Ernst von Caemmerer/
Arthur Nikisch/Konrad Zweigert (eds.), Festschrift für Hans Dölle, Volume 1 (1962) 65;
reprinted with an introduction by Kurt Nadelmann in Mich. L. Rev. 65 (1966) 1; Alan Watson,
The Comity of Errors (1992). For its current status, see Lawrence Collins, Comity in Modern
Private International Law, in: James Fawcett (ed.), Reform and Development of Private International Law – Essays in Honour of Sir Peter North (2002) 89-110.
29
Kegel/Schurig (supra note 24) 139 (§ 2 II 3).
30
Kegel/Schurig (supra note 24) 148-158 (§ 2 IV); Jan Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht (2001) 31-32 (§ 5 I 1); Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (-Sonnenberger) (4th ed. 2006)
Einl. zum IPR No. 13.
31
American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971).
32
For criticism, see e.g. Reppy (supra note 3) 655 et seq.
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The third combination between a private law and an international law
concept can be called sublation. Given how problematic the distinction between
private and public law is even in domestic law, the distinction is almost
impossible to uphold in private international law, which is intrinsically both
private and international. As private considerations can be translated into public
considerations in domestic law and vice versa, so the private law conception of
private international law can be translated into an international law conception
and vice versa. On the one hand, it is possible to translate all private interests
into state interests, provided governmental interests are defined as furthering a
particular state’s conception of justice and efficiency between individuals. For
example, US cases occasionally propose state policies in promoting the
interests of individuals that trump the state policies behind substantive law –
for example the interest of states in being good market-places33. The European
Court of Justice (ECJ) argued in Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc. that European rules about mandatory indemnification of
commercial agents, aimed at protecting these agent’s private interests, was
required for a common market (a public interest) and therefore internationally
mandatory34. Since all differences between the private law regimes of different
states will ultimately have some relevance for the market35, this public interest
can be used for all kinds of rules, including those that ostensibly protect only
private interests. On the other hand, all state interests can be translated into
private interests. The debate about whether Article 7 (2) of the Rome I
Convention36 protects private rights or only public interests provides a good
example37. Sublation thus makes it possible to consider all arguments from a
public law concept of private international law in a private law concept, and
vice versa.
The choice between a “private law” and an “international law” conception of
private international law is therefore not a decision that directly determines the
answers to specific questions in the field. Within each model, differentiations
are possible; neither model is conclusive. At the same time the distinction is not
irrelevant. Whether one starts from a private law conception or an international
law conception determines the relation between rule and exception, and it

33

Cf. e.g. Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 25 (1964): “the policy of both states, Oregon
and California, in favor of enforcing contracts, has been lost sight of in favor of a questionable
policy in Oregon” (Goodwin, diss.).
34
ECJ 09.11.2000 – Case C-381/98 (Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc.)
E.C.R. I-9305 (2000).
35
Cf. Michaels/Kamann (supra note 25) 305 and 311.
36
Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 19 June 1980
(consolidated version in O.J. C 27 of 16 January 1998, 34 et seq.).
37
See von Bar/Mankowski (supra note 27) 262-269 (§ 4 No. 89-98) with numerous
references. The authors themselves argue for restricting Article 7 to public interests.
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determines the kind of arguments to be used and their respective force in legal
argument.
III. Cross-Border Torts in Traditional Doctrine
Possibly the most important issue for private international law of torts is which
law applies when the conduct and injury occur at different places38. In the
doctrine, four basic approaches exist. First, the law of the place of conduct
might apply. This is the essence of Article 8 (1) of a Japanese reform proposal39
and is reappearing, in disguise, in the European Union, under the country-oforigin principle40. This solution is justified, usually, with the injurer’s interests
– he knows where he acts and can be expected to know and comply with the
laws of that place, but not with the (potentially multiple) laws of places where
his conduct may cause injuries41. A second approach applies the law of the
place of the injury, the general solution under Article 5 (1) of the Rome II
Proposal42. A formal justification, once influential under the vested rights
theory, has since lost ground: the injury was the last event necessary for the
plaintiff’s right to come into existence43. The more important substantive
argument is the protection of the victim: unlike the injurer, the victim cannot
control for conduct and effects, so he should be able to rely on the protections
of his home law. One frequently made argument for applying the law of the

38

For a comprehensive analysis, see Jan von Hein, Das Günstigkeitsprinzip im Internationalen Deliktsrecht (1999).
39
The Study Group of the New Legislation of Private International Law, Draft Articles on
the Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual Obligations (2), Article 8 (1),
published in English in Japanese Annual Int’l L. 40 (1997) 57: “Torts shall be governed by the
law of the place where the conduct causing the damage occurs. If that place does not belong to
any country, Japanese law shall be applied.” The Draft Articles provide exceptions for the
important areas of product liability (Article 9), Personality Rights (Article 10), Unfair
Competition (Article 11) and Environmental Pollution (Article 12).
40
See Michaels, EU Law as Conflict of Laws (supra note 4), also for differences.
41
Cf. Michael Anderson, Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is Tort
Law the Answer?: Washburn L. J. 41 (2002) 399, 417.
42
Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Law
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (“Rome II”), COM(2006) 83 final (hereinafter
“Amended Rome II Proposal”): “Where no choice has been made under Article 4, the law
applicable to a non-contractual obligation shall be the law of the country in which the damage
arises or is likely to arise, irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the
damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect
consequences of that event arise.”
43
Joseph H. Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, Volume II – Choice of Law (
1935) 1285 et seq. Another argument one occasionally finds – conduct without injury does not
create liability – is inconclusive: injury not caused by conduct does not create liability, either.
See Kegel/Schurig (supra note 24) 723 (§ 18 IV 1 a aa).
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place of injury is that the law now emphasizes compensation over deterrence
and punishment44.
Two other approaches use both places either cumulatively or alternatively.
The third approach leads to cumulative application: liability is incurred only if
both laws provide for it. A comparable solution (cumulative application of lex
loci delicti and lex fori) existed formerly in English law and (for German
defendants) in German law45; it is still the law in Japan46. The justification is a
desire to protect defendants, especially forum domiciliaries, and the approach
has been criticized for that. The fourth possibility, justified with the victim’s
interests, leads to alternative application: liability is incurred if either of the
two laws provides for it. The determination which of the two laws should be
applied may be made by the judge (this used to be the law in Germany47 and
has been proposed for the United States48), or by the plaintiff. In the latter case,
the law can, absent a choice by the plaintiff, provide presumptively for the
place of conduct, as in Germany49 or the place of the injury, as in Italy50 and
44

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Councile on the Law
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (“Rome II”), COM(2003) 427 final (hereinafter
“Rome II Proposal 2003”), 12 (referring to “the modern concept of the law of civil liability
which is no longer, as it was in the first half of the last century, oriented towards punishing for
fault-based conduct: nowadays, it is the compensation function that dominates, as can be seen
from the proliferation of no-fault strict liability schemes.”); Kropholler (supra note 30) 498
(§ 53 IV 2). Accordingly, some have proposed applying the law of the place of conduct to one
type of tort and the law of the place of the injury to other types; see the references in
Kegel/Schurig (supra note 24) 724 (§ 18 IV 1 a aa).
45
Phillips v. Eyre, (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B, 1, 28-29; Article 38 of the Introductory Law to the
Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch – EGBGB) (until 1999).
46
Horei, Act on the Application of Laws (Law No. 10 of 1898) Article 11. The Act is
published in English translation by Kent Anderson/Yasuhiro Okuda in: Asian-Pacific L. &
Pol’y J. 3 (2002) 230, available at <http:// http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/pdfs/v3-08Okuda.pdf>. It provides:
Article 11 [Formation and Effect of Non-Contractual Claims]
(1) The formation and effect of claims arising from agency by necessity (negotiorum
gestio), unjust enrichment, and tort shall be governed by the law of the place where the
events causing the claims occurred.
(2) The preceding paragraph shall not apply where the events that comprise the tort
occurred abroad and do not constitute a tort under Japanese law.
(3) Even where the events that occurred abroad constitute a tort under Japanese law, the
injured person may not demand recovery of damages or any other remedy not available
under Japanese law.
47
E.g. RG 30.03.1903, RGZ 54, 198, 205.
48
Russell J. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws (1986) 360. For revision, see
Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 2001) 356: because tort laws have
become more plaintiff-friendly, the rule is no longer desirable.
49
Article 40 (1) EGBGB; English translation in Peter Hay, From Rule-Orientation to
“Approach” in German Conflicts Law: Am. J. Comp. L. 47 (1999) 633, 650: “Claims arising
from tort are governed by the law of the state in which the person liable to provide
compensation acted. The injured person may demand, however, that the law of the state where
the result took effect be applied instead. The right to make this election may be exercised only
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enable choice of the respective other law. The European Rome II Proposal does
not contain such a rule for two reasons: it would go beyond the victim’s
legitimate expectations, and it would lead to unpredictability51. The proposal
does, however, in its Article 8 provide for the plaintiff’s choice for a specific
tort: injuries to the environment. Three reasons are given.52 One reason for this
solution is sympathy with the plaintiff53; critics see no reason to treat victims in
international torts better than those in domestic torts54. A second reason is
substantive: a desire for a high level of protection.55 A third argument is
economic in nature; it focuses on regulatory interests: Applying exclusively the
law of the place where the damage is sustained could give an operator an
incentive to establish his facilities at the border so as to discharge toxic
substances into a river and enjoy the benefit of the neighbouring country’s laxer
rules. This solution would be contrary to the underlying philosophy of the
European substantive law of the environment and the “polluter pays” principle,
which forces injurers to internalise costs56.
B. The First Economic Model: A Private Law Model

A first way to look at these issues from an economic perspective is to use
what I call an economic private law model. Main representatives of such a
model in the literature are Michael J. Whincop and Mary Keyes as well as Erin
A. O’Hara and Larry E. Ribstein57. For a private law model, an economic
analysis of private international law should focus on individuals as rational
agents58 and set private international law rules so as to give the optimal
incentives to these individuals in order to maximize global social welfare,
in the court of first instance and then only until the end of the first oral proceeding or the end
of the written pre-trial proceeding.”
50
Law No. 218 of 31 May 1995, English translation in I.L.M. 35 (1996) 760. Article 62 (1)
provides: “Tortious liability shall be governed by the law of the State in which the damage
occurred. Nonetheless, the person suffering damage may request the application of the law of the
State in which the event causing the damage took place.”. For a slightly different translation, see
Rudolf Schlesinger/Hans W. Baade/Peter E. Herzog/Edward M. Wise, Comparative Law (6th
ed. 1998) 946.
51
Rome II Proposal 2003 (supra note 44) 11-12.
52
Amended Rome II Proposal (supra note 42), Preamble No. 14.
53
Kegel/Schurig (supra note 24) 725 (§ 18 IV 1 a aa).
54
Kropholler (supra note 30) 498 (§ 53 IV 2); cf. von Bar/Mankowski (supra note 27) 614
(§ 7 No. 105).
55
Rome II Proposal 2003 (supra note 44) 19.
56
Rome II Proposal 2003 (supra note 44) 19 et seq.
57
Supra notes 6, 8.
58
See e.g. Whincop/Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism (supra note 6) 4 (with a nominalist
argument: “as befits private law, we emphasize parties and party interests”); O’Hara/Ribstein,
From Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1152 (“because political leaders cannot be expected
to maximize social welfare”).
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defined as the sum of all individual utilities. Different legal regimes can be
tested and chosen for their efficiency, and choice-of-law rules must be shaped
so as to enable parties to minimize their costs while maximizing their benefits.
Private international law becomes an extension on private law. This makes it
necessary first to look at the economics of tort law.
I.

Basic Economics of Tort Law

Tort law, from the perspective of welfare economics, is not concerned with
preventing behaviour that is wrongful in a moral sense, but rather with
maximization of welfare59. In his seminal 1970 study, The Costs of Accidents60,
Guido Calabresi recognizes the reduction of costs as one of two primary goals
of accident law (the other being justice)61. Calabresi distinguishes three kinds
of costs to be reduced – primary, secondary, and tertiary costs62. Primary costs
are the costs to victims from accidents that take place as well as the costs to
injurers from exercising care in order to avoid accidents63. Reduction of
primary costs means reduction of the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs
of avoiding accidents. The avoidance of accidents, in itself costly, is not always
desirable but only when its costs do not outweigh its benefits. Secondary costs
concern the spreading of risks arising from economically desirable conduct,
especially through insurance systems and the “deep pocket theory”. Tertiary
costs are the costs arising from administering the treatment of accidents,
including the costs of effectuating the primary and secondary goals. These costs
include the information costs for parties and judges regarding the content of the
applicable law, a particularly important factor in private international law.
The goal of reducing all these costs can lead to tensions between primary,
secondary, and tertiary cost reduction, because the reduction of costs on one
level may entail the rise of costs on another level64. The goal may also lead to
tensions between the interests of injurers and those of victims, because
reduction of costs for injurers may well enhance costs of victims and vice
59

On some uncertainty about whether social welfare, efficiency, or wealth maximization is
the goal of economic analysis, see Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?: Maryland L. Rev. 64 (2005) 101, 109 et seq.
60
Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents (1970).
61
Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents (supra note 60) 24 et seq. On the unclear place of
justice in his analysis, see Jules Coleman, The Costs of the Costs of Accidents: Maryland L.
Rev. 64 (2005) 337, 344 et seq.
62
Cf. Hans-Bernd Schäfer/Claus Ott, Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts
(2005) 129-140. For a similar implicit structure, see Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic
Analysis of Law (2004) 177-256 (Chapter 8-10: primary costs), 257-279 (Chapter 11:
secondary costs) and 280-287 (Chapter 12: tertiary costs).
63
Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents (supra note 60) 226 et seq. and 73 et seq.
64
Cf. Schäfer/Ott (supra note 62) 140 et seq.
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versa. Here, the analysis aims at the overall minimization of costs: it considers
it justified to raise the costs of one group of individuals if this raise is more
than outweighed by the reduction of costs to the other individuals. The relevant
criterion is Kaldor-Hicks (or “potential Pareto”) efficiency, regardless of the
normative problems with this criterion65.
How are these goals achieved from a welfare economics perspective? To
minimize primary costs, tort law should set incentives through liability rules so
individuals engage in conduct that is beneficial (because its social benefits are
higher than its social costs) and refrain from conduct that is not (because its
social benefits are lower than its social costs). This applies to injurers and
victims alike: to the extent that victims can avoid accidents more cheaply than
injurers, it is economically efficient for them, rather than for injurers to invest
in accident precaution66. To minimize secondary costs, insurance becomes
relevant. (Because insurance lies outside the area of tort law, secondary costs
will not be considered further here.) Finally, regarding tertiary costs, even
liability rules that set the optimal incentives in the abstract may be inefficient if
the cost of their administration is too great. In this case, plaintiffs may not bring
suits that would be beneficial and injurers therefore engage in moral hazard, or
plaintiffs may bring suits that are not beneficial because their costs are higher
than the social benefits they provide, but they are able to force defendants into
costly settlements.
II. Consequences for Private International Law
An economic private law model will apply these considerations to the design of
private international law rules67. Private international law rules should achieve
two connected goals: they should reduce the costs of accidents, and they should
enable individuals to coordinate their conduct. Multi-state situations provide a
plurality of potentially applicable laws with different effects on the reduction of
costs. The applicable law can be determined in accordance with two considerations. The first is similar to that in substantive law: Which law is best at
65

Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (1987) 33 note 4 (“it is little consolation to be
told that it is possible to compensate [the losers] fully, but [‘good God!’] no actual plan to do
so”); Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare: Yale L. J. 112 (2003) 1511, 1517 (“That
[certain states of affairs] are potentially Pareto superior has as much bearing on how they
should be treated as the fact that I am potentially President of the United States has on how I
should be treated now.”). Another problem with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is its potential
intransitivity; cf. Schäfer/Ott (supra note 62) 32 et seq.
66
See Shavell, Foundations (supra note 62) 182 et seq.; Schäfer/Ott (supra note 62) 221 et
seq.
67
Whincop/Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism (supra note 6) 3 (“the policies that underlie what
we think of as ‘substantive’ private law areas should, where suitable, inform the private international law rules that apply in these areas.”), 89 et seq. (for what they call non-market torts).
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reducing costs; which law is the “better law”? Social welfare can no longer, as
in the ordinary context in which tort rules are evaluated, be calculated with
reference to just one state’s economy, but this does not pose a big problem. For
a private law model focusing on individuals, national economies are irrelevant
anyway; instead, the goal is maximization of global social welfare understood
as the sum of the utilities of all individuals worldwide68. It follows that it does
not matter much whether the parties are from the same state and litigate over an
accident that took place in that state, or whether the injurer is from Germany,
the victim from Japan, and the accident happened in the United States. What
can matter is that the laws of different states may each be efficient for different
contexts, regional peculiarities, etc. This can be because different societies have
different preferences69, or because different levels of care are efficient for
different territories. These differences suggest that, ceteris paribus, the most
efficient law in a given situation will be the law passed by the legislator with a
regulatory advantage70.
The second consideration regarding the reduction of costs refers to
predictability. Assuming perfect information, parties know in advance which
law will apply and what the content of that law is, so they can adapt their
conduct accordingly. If, however, information is costly to obtain, predictability
of the applicable law reduces primary costs because individuals can adapt their
conduct to the applicable laws and exercise the required level of care at lower
costs71. Even if predictable rules of private international law lead to the
occasional application of suboptimal substantive tort rules, the costs arising
from their application may still be outweighed by the reduction in information
costs, making their application still efficient overall. Predictable rules also help
reduce tertiary costs72. They reduce the post-accident costs of determining the
applicable law as well as the costs of litigation and thereby enable victims to
bring claims to which they are entitled and enable injurers to defend themselves
against unfounded claims at lower costs.
Predictability of the applicable tort rules thus becomes the most important
consideration for the private law model. Ex-ante predictability enables parties
to optimise their conduct vis-à-vis the incentives set by the applicable tort
rules. Ex-post predictability enables parties to either settle rationally in the
shadow of a defined substantive law or litigate matters of that substantive law
68

Siehr (supra note 9) 274; Guzman (supra note 9) 898.
See e.g. Shavell, Foundations (supra note 62) 202 et seq. and 205 et seq.
70
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2003) 602-603; for discussion, see
Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law (supra note 9) 59-68;
O’Hara/Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1179-1180 (2000); Whincop/
Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism (supra note 6) 20.
71
Whincop/Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism (supra note 6) 91 et seq.
72
See Michael J. Whincop/Mary Keyes, Towards an Economic Theory of Private International Law: Austral. J. Leg. Phil. 25 (2000) 1, 14 et seq.
69
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without too much regard to issues of choice of law. Ex-post predictability also
ensures, for the same reason, that courts will face no substantial additional
costs from determining the applicable law. Given the high information costs
attributed to private international law problems, the substantive content of the
applicable law becomes comparatively negligible.
Not surprisingly, party autonomy is the preferred instrument even beyond its
traditional application to matters of contract law, because it minimizes these
information costs73. Where party autonomy is unsuitable, proponents of private
law models often propose application of the lex loci delicti rule as relatively
easy to predict74. This high emphasis on predictability is in accordance with
goals of traditional methods of choice of law, both in the United States and in
Europe75. Policy considerations that led to the demise of lex loci delicti in the
United States and, to some extent, in Europe, have little influence on this model
because these considerations are generally based on regulatory state interests,
and regulatory state interests are typically considered nonexistent, irrelevant, or
possibly even pernicious in a private law model.
III. Reducing Accident Costs
How does all of this play out for cross-border torts? The main issue in crossborder torts are primary costs. This has several components: the costs of having
to ascertain the content of the rule, the potential costs from having to comply
with that rule or more than one set of rules, and the costs arising from
application of that rule.
As for the first two components, it is impossible to say in the abstract
whether a place-of-conduct rule or a place-of-injury rule reduces costs. If the
law of the place of conduct applies, the injurer faces low costs for ascertaining
its content because it is typically his home law and because only one set of laws
will apply to him. The victim, on the other hand, faces high costs of
ascertaining the content of the applicable law, which is foreign to him, and
several laws may apply to the victim if he must take precautions against
injurers in different countries. If, on the other hand, the law of the place of
injury applies, the reverse situation exists. The injurer faces high costs for
ascertaining its content and several laws may apply in respect to injuries
73

Whincop/Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism (supra note 6) 5 et seq. (general) and 78 et seq.
(for “market torts”); Whincop/Keyes, Towards an Economic Theory of Private International
Law (supra note 72) 17-22; O’Hara/Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1186
et seq. (general) and 1210 et seq. (for “market torts”).
74
Whincop/Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism (supra note 6) 97 et seq.; O’Hara/Ribstein,
From Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1216-1218.
75
But see e.g. Kegel/Schurig (supra note 24) 143 (§ 3 II 3 c) (predictability only one
among many interests); for a brief analysis of the tension between predictability and fairness,
see Kropholler (supra note 30) 29-31 (§ 4 IV).
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occurring in different countries. The victim, on the other hand, faces low costs
of ascertaining the content of the applicable law, and only this one law applies
to him.
Some argue that the place of injury is more predictable for both parties
because the injurer generally knows and has some control over that place,
whereas the victim may not know where the harmful conduct will occur76. In
other words, the injurer is the cheaper cost-avoider regarding information and
control costs. Although intuitively plausible, this intuition cannot be dependably generalized. In the case of a polluting plant, for example, the place of
conduct is easy to predict and control for both injurers and victims, whereas the
place of injury depends on many contingencies such as wind, vulnerability of
different local crops, etc. As for control, the Internet provides another counterexample: filtering software now enables injurers to avoid certain markets for
their potentially tortious conduct, but it also enables victims to bar information
from certain countries and thereby avoid injuries77. It is not clear generally
whether it is cheaper for injurers to control for accidents occurring to victims at
certain places than it is for victims to control for accidents caused by injurers
acting at certain places78.
What about the different incentives given by these rules? Assume an injurer,
acting in country A, causes some injuries in country A and some in another
country B. Assume accidents are unilateral – only injurers can influence the
accident risk with their behaviour – and liability regimes in A and B can be
either strict liability regimes or negligence regimes79. Then four distinct
scenarios are possible. In the first, both countries have the same liability
regimes – either strict liability regimes, or negligence regimes setting the same
level of due care. Here choice of law does not matter.
In the second scenario, country A has a strict liability regime and country B
has a negligence regime. Under a place-of-conduct rule, the injurer will
exercise the globally optimal level of care because the applicable strict liability
regime of country A forces him to internalise all accident costs. Under a placeof-injury rule, the injurer will overinvest in care if the due level of care under
country B’s liability regime is higher than the global optimum and the injurer’s
marginal costs of raising his level of care from the global optimum to that of
76
O’Hara/Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency (supra note 9) 1217; cf. Hamburg Group
for Private International Law, Comments on the European Commission’s Draft Proposal for a
Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations: RabelsZ 67 (2003)
1, 11.
77
Cf. Horatia Muir Watt, Yahoo! Cyber Collision of Cultures – Who Regulates?: Mich. J.
Int’l L. 24 (2003) 673, 693 et seq.
78
Although O’Hara/Ribstein think the place of the conduct has a regulatory advantage for
the regulation of conduct, they prefer a place-of-injury rule: O’Hara/Ribstein, From Politics to
Efficiency (supra note 9) 1217.
79
Cf. Shavell, Foundations (supra note 62) 180-182 for the efficiency or negligence
regimes and strict liability regimes for unilateral torts.
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country B’s regime are lower than the sum of benefits from avoiding all
liability costs with regard to injuries in country B and the benefits from the
reduction of injuries in country A. He will underinvest in care if the due level
of care under country B’s liability regime is lower than the global optimum and
his marginal costs of raising the level of care from that of country B to the
global optimum would be higher than his marginal benefits from reducing
accident costs in country A. (He will not internalise the marginal benefits from
a reduction of accident costs in country B because once he reaches the due level
of care of country B’s laws, he will not be liable for accidents there, anyway.
In the third scenario, country A has a negligence regime while country B has
a strict liability regime. A place-of-conduct rule is inefficient because it will
lead the injurer to exercise the due level of care under country A’s law, which
may be too high or too low globally. If the due level of care under the law of A
is too low, he will underinvest in care. If the due level of care under the law of
A is too high, he will exercise a globally optimal level of care only if his
marginal benefits (the reduction in costs for care) are higher than the liability
costs. Yet a place-of-injury rule is also inefficient. The injurer will still
overinvest or underinvest in care depending on the due level of care under
country A’s law and its impact on his marginal costs and benefits.
In the fourth scenario, both country A and country B have negligence
regimes with different levels of due care. Now the injurer will either underinvest or overinvest under either private international law rule. Under a placeof-conduct rule he will again, like in the third scenario, adopt the due level of
care of country A, which may be too high or too low on a global level. The
analysis of a place-of-injury rule is more complex. If the due level of care is
higher in country B than in country A80, the injurer avoids liability to victims in
country A by exercising the due level of care of country A’s laws and avoids all
liability by exercising the due level of care of country B’s laws. Between these
two, the injurer will exercise the due level of care of country B’s laws if the
marginal benefits of avoiding all liability costs are higher than the marginal
costs of raising the level of care. Provided that the expected injury costs in state
B are sufficiently high, this is the likelier outcome. Injurers will frequently
exercise more care than the global optimum.
Assuming both countries A and B have negligence regimes and set the due
level of care at the nationally optimal level, and assuming this level to be
higher in A than in B, the global optimum must lie between the two due levels
of care. Lantermann and Schäfer argue that this makes a place-of-injury rule is
superior. Under a place-of-conduct rule, the injurer will overinvest or
underinvest in care regarding the injuries in another state, depending on
80

The analysis applies mutatis mutandis if the due level of care is stricter in country B
than in country A, because under a place-of-injury law it does not matter which of the two
countries is the place of conduct.
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whether the law of the place of conduct is stricter or less strict than that of the
place of injury. Under a place-of-injury rule, he will exercise a level of care
somewhere between the levels of the place of conduct and the place of injury
and therefore closer to the optimal level81. But does the injurer ever have an
incentive of exercising a level of care X between those of the laws of countries
A and B? He does not have such an incentive under a place-of-conduct rule,
and he has such an incentive under a place-of-injury rule only under two
conditions. First, the marginal costs of raising the level of care from the
standard of country B to X must be lower than the marginal benefits from a
reduction of accident costs in country A. (Note that the injurer can externalize
the costs for accidents arising in country B to the victims of these accidents
because he will not be liable to them, so he will exercise less care than would
be globally efficient.) Second, the further marginal costs of raising the level of
care from X to the standard of country A (and thereby avoiding all liability)
must be higher than the liability costs at X (which equal the accident costs in
country A at the level of care X). Whether this is indeed the case depends on
the respective values of the variables, an empirical matter. The globally optimal
level of care may or may not be reached82.
The insights from this analysis are therefore quite limited. A globally
optimal level of care will be reached if the choice-of-law rule designates a
system with strict liability. This is trivial, because strict liability is always efficient for unilateral accidents83. If one or more negligence regimes are designated, however, the injurer may or may not exercise the globally optimal level
of care. A place-of-conduct rule leads the injurer to exercise too much or too
81
Hans-Bernd Schäfer/Katrin Lantermann, Choice of Law in Economic Perspective, in
this volume, p. ***. One problem with this argument is that it does not distinguish sufficiently
between the optimal level of care in a given country and the liability regime in that country.
The globally optimal level of care will indeed frequently lie between the nationally optimal
levels in different countries. But this is less a function of different laws than it is a function of
different factual situations. How high the optimal level of care is in a country depends on
many local facts (the costs of building fences, the value of assets at risk of being injured, etc.)
that are unaffected by the applicable law.
82
For illustration of the fourth case (two negligence regimes), see the following table.

Level of care

Liability under
country A

Liability under
country B

Total expected costs for injurer
under a place-of-injury rule

0
due level of B
X (B < x < A)
due level of A

CA0 (A)
CAA (A)
CAX (A)
0

CAo (B)
0
0
0

CAo (A) + CAo (B)
CCB + CAo (A)
CCX + CAx (A)
CCB

Costs of care are defined as CCstandard of care: 0 < CCA < CX < CB. Total costs of accidents are
defined as the sum of costs of accidents in country A and costs of accidents in country B:
and
CAstandard of care = CAstandard of care (A) + CAstandard of care (B): CA0 > CAA > CAX > CAB
CA0 (A) > CAA (A) > CAX (A) > CAB (A) and CA0 (B) > CAA (B) > CAX (B) > CAB(B). Level
X of care will be attained if (CCx - CCb) < (CAx (A) + CA0 (A) AND (CCB - CCX) > CAx (A).
83
Shavell, Foundations (supra note 62) 179-180.
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little care, depending on whether the due level of care under the law of A lies
above or below the global optimum. A place-of-injury rule will frequently lead
the injurer to exercise too much care. This is so if one of the countries has a
negligence regime that sets the due level of care above the global optimum and
if the marginal benefits from avoiding liability under that law (plus the
marginal benefits from reducing liability under the other state’s regime if that
law is a strict liability regime) are higher than the marginal costs of exercising
care at that level instead of at the global optimum.
IV. Injunctions and Punitive Damages
As long as injuries lead only to a duty to compensate, an injurer could simply
decide to ignore the requirements of the law of the place of the injury and just
pay compensation. He will have an incentive to do so if that state has a strict
liability system, but not necessarily if it has a negligence system, because the
benefits from complying with the requirements will frequently be higher than
the costs. He cannot opt to just pay compensation, though, if the law of state A
grants victims a property right instead of a liability right by giving them the
power to enjoin the conduct altogether. A similar problem arises if the law of
the place of the injury provides for punitive damages. By granting injunctions
or punitive damages, the law of the place of the injury effectively regulates
beyond the injuries to its own state: it regulates the whole conduct. As a consequence, the injurer must comply with this law in addition to the laws of other
places of injury. This combination may lead to inefficient overinvestment in
care.
Of course, if transaction costs between injurers and victims are sufficiently
low, neither injunctions nor punitive damages will prevent efficient conduct
from taking place. Instead, victims will trade their right to an injunction or to
punitive damages for a compensation higher than their actual injuries. This
reduces the benefits that the injurer derives from his conduct, but because he
still derives a benefit, he will still proceed. The effect is only one of
distribution between injurers and victims. However, giving the victim a
monopoly over the injurer’s conduct can lead to holdout and transaction costs.
This provides an additional argument for a place of injury rule.
V. Firms as Injurers and Competitive Markets
What if injurers are firms that produce in state A and sell in states A and B, so
they cause accidents in both states? Accident costs will have an impact on the
price of products because they are part of the costs associated with production.
This does not change the incentives for the parties to exercise care, but it
affects the price of products: the higher the expected liability, the more
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expensive the products will be84. This in turn has implications for the efficiency
of choice-of-law rules. If a place-of-injury rule creates higher costs for injurers
than a place-of-conduct rule, then injurers involved in cross-border activities
must either raise the price for their product or reduce production.
The latter is often desirable from an efficiency perspective. As long as
negligence regimes do not account for the level of activity85, producers have an
incentive to produce too much and thereby to cause too many accidents under a
negligence regime because, provided they exercise the due level of care, they
do not have to internalize the additional accident costs86. This tendency is
countered if injurers in turn face higher liability costs as a consequence from
the plurality of applicable laws under a place-of-injury rule. A problem is that
only firms that cause accidents outside their place of conduct face these
additional costs; domestic firms are subject only to their own law. This gives
domestic firms a competitive advantage over international firms, and this in
turn would prevent full competition and thereby create efficiency losses. In
state B, domestic firms from B can have a competitive advantage over firms
from state A.
If, on the other hand, the applicable law is the law of the place of conduct,
injurers from state A do not face these additional costs in the market of B. A
priori this seems to put them on an equal playing field with domestic firms
from state B, who only face the costs arising from one law as well. However,
the fact that the laws of state A and state B differ may prevent full competition.
If state A has a stricter liability regime than state B, producers from state A are
still at a competitive disadvantage87. If state A has a less strict regime,
producers from state A exporting their goods to state B can have a competitive
advantage over domestic producers from state B; this can likewise prevent full
competition and create efficiency losses. Two additional considerations must be
kept in mind. First, foreign firms face additional transaction costs from crossborder trade (although some of these may be made up for by efficiency gains
due to economies of scale from their cross-border trade). Second, even if
foreign firms have a competitive advantage over domestic firms, under a placeof-conduct rule this makes it easier for them to enter a foreign market. This in
turn leads to more market participants and, presumably, to more competition
84

Shavell, Foundations (supra note 62) 207-209.
For this problem in general, see Shavell, Foundations (supra note 62) 193 et seq.;
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and therefore to efficiency gains, provided the liability regime in the place of
conduct is not severely more lax than that in the place of injury.
C. The Second Economic Model: An International Law Model
I.

Basic Economics of International Law

An international law model, whose most prominent representatives in the
literature are Lea Brilmayer, Larry Kramer, and Joel P. Trachtman88, is
different. Structurally, the economics of international law, which underlies an
international law model of private international law, look very similar to the
economics of private law89. (This is not surprising, given that international law
in its early formulation by Hugo Grotius looked very similar to, and was in fact
based on, private law.) Like the economic analysis of private law, the economic
analysis of international law assumes that actors are rational in the sense that
they maximize their own utilities; its normative goal is efficiency, and the
instrument to achieve efficiency consists in rules that set optimal incentives for
the actors or that mimic contractual agreements between them, ensuring that
they engage in efficient and refrain from inefficient conduct. For an international law model private international law is an extension of public international law. As a consequence, an economic analysis must focus on states as
rational agents whose relevant conduct is the enforcement of their laws. Indeed,
most studies on the economic analysis of (public) international law, at least in
the United States, are based on a “realist” perspective in which states are the
only relevant actors90. In this model, choice-of-law rules must be shaped so as
to enable states to maximize the sum of their interests.
While a focus on the interests of individual actors seems unproblematic,
looking at states as rational actors seems to clash with the credo of (classical
and neo-classical) economics, “methodological individualism”91. How can one
author simultaneously endorse methodological individualism and focuses on
states as actors92? This question entails two answers, one theoretical (Is it
88
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possible to create a model in which states are rational actors?) and one
normative (Is such a model appropriate?).
The theoretical question on the level of modelling is easier to answer. It is
possible to focus on states as actors even if states are not real actors, because it
is irrelevant for a model whether its agents are accurate descriptions of their
real-life counterparts, as long as the actions relevant for the model can be
attributed to those agents. People frequently speak of the actions of “states”,
and the policies and interests of states (as incorporated in their laws), although
they know states do not really act as individuals and do not really have interests
of their own. The assumption of states as monolithic actors is a simplifying
assumption. Such simplifying assumptions are frequent in economic analysis93.
For example, economic analysis frequently treats firms as individuals although
they are not individuals. States are different insofar as they are not under the
same kind of competitive pressure, but they are similar insofar as both firms
and states are incapable of building preferences of their own. Similarly,
classical economics assumes individuals to be rational actors, although it is
well known that individuals rarely act rationally in fact94.
More pertinent is the normative question whether a model that focuses on
states as actors can be appropriate. Four general considerations suggest that, at
least for private international law, such a model should not be rejected a priori.
First, private international law deals with the conflict of laws between states. In
other words, its objects are laws, and the creating of these laws, as well as their
binding force, are attributed to states. Conceiving of states as monolithic actors
for an economic model reflects the similar simplification occurring in private
international law95: private international law norms designate the law of a state,
rather than the views of the legislators versus those of the courts, etc.96 The
main normative criticism against a concept of the state as a monolithic actor is
the public choice argument that legislation and adjudication in the name of
states are really carried out by individuals with special interests and under
special influence from certain subgroups of society97. In other words, individuals acting in the name of the state do not properly represent the interests of
93
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its people. This criticism may well be true, but it points to a problem of
substantive law that is not enhanced by private international law and can
therefore be left to the economic analysis of lawmaking98. A separate question
is the impact of public choice considerations on the formulation of choice-oflaw rules by the states99 – a question not addressed here because choice-of-law
rules are treated as independent variables and because the focus is on a
hypothetical global lawmaker.
Second, in a world with imperfect information, a working assumption that
states have the best abilities to determine (domestically) efficient rules for
individuals seems justifiable100. This makes it possible to use state preferences
as proxies for sums of individual utilities within one state101. Third, although
law and economics may postulate that overall social welfare maximization
should trump all other public considerations102, actual substantive laws do
effectuate considerations other than the maximization of social welfare. Since
these other considerations are responsible for a number of differences between
the laws of different countries, an economic analysis of private international
law that disregards these reasons will simultaneously strip private international
law as its object of analysis of much of its scope. This leads to a fourth
consideration. At least in democratic states, such differences in preferences
rest, presumably, on the voters’ decisions. Public choice can account for imperfections in the democratic process, but it is not normally used to deny the
legitimacy of democratic lawmaking altogether. Rather, the enforcement of
democratically enacted laws may in itself be considered a relevant factor in an
efficiency analysis even between individuals103. In this sense, even seemingly
inefficient laws may be assumed to maximize domestic social welfare in a
wider sense104.
States can thus be modelled, like individuals, as rational in the sense that
they care only about their own costs and preferences, and not those of other
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states. But what are state preferences, and what do states maximize in private
international law? One answer is that states do not maximize anything, but
instead merely minimize the costs of regulation. In this case the efficient solution is to apply the law of the state which can regulate most efficiently, Richard
Posner’s concept of regulatory advantage105. A second answer is that societies
maximize their own welfare, understood as the sum total of the costs and
benefits for its own citizens106. A third answer is that states maximize the
effectiveness of their own policies as embodied, especially, in their legislation107. States want to maximize the effectiveness of those laws they care
about and minimize the effectiveness of foreign laws in situations in which this
impairs their own policies. Even when states have policies that appear inefficient or even irrational, these rules become relevant factors in a global efficiency analysis. Just as an economic analysis of private law will accept individuals’ preferences as given, whether they appear sound or not, so an economic analysis of international law must accept the policies of states as their
preferences, whether they make sense or not.
Another important question is whether global efficiency should be defined in
terms of Pareto efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,
already problematic between individuals108, becomes even more unattractive
internationally. One reason is that differences both in wealth and in preferences
between states are often much larger than within one society; this makes wealth
effects much more influential109. More importantly, one important justification
for Kaldor-Hicks in domestic settings is largely unavailable in the international
arena. Within one state, the avoidance of distributional questions inherent in the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion is often justified with the existence of a tax system,
which is deemed superior for (re-)distribution110. International law, however,
does not operate within a system that enables easy redistribution through a tax
system or through some other side-payment system from one national economy
to the other111. States therefore have no reason to accept rules that are
detrimental to them unless they can hope, in the long run, to be compensated
for doing so. For similar reasons, it is questionable whether a hypothetical
105
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global legislator should be entitled to pass private international law rules that
benefit some states while hurting others.
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is a less attractive criterion for international
situations for another reason. States, at least when they are democratic, are
accountable to their own citizens, while a global legislator, hypothetical or real,
is not. An analysis of international law that forces one society to bear costs so
another society can benefit not only will gain little support within a democratic
system, but it raises costs if any positive value is assigned to democratic
legitimacy and accountability112. This means that if states themselves decide
about their conflict-of-laws rules, there may be situations in which each state
would be justified in applying its own law because applying a foreign law
would leave it worse off. For global legislators, this suggests that choice-of-law
rules stripping a state of the jurisdiction to apply its law to a situation in which
it is interested can be justified as Pareto efficient only if the state is
compensated, either because it acquires the right to regulate other at least
equally important situations, or through side payments.
II. Consequences for Private International Law
What, then, is the task of private international law rules in a model that focuses
on states as rational agents? It should make sure that legislative jurisdiction lies
with the state that values it most, and it should help overcome coordination
problems between states. But because states, not individuals, are the relevant
actors, the analysis looks quite different from that in a private law model.
Private international law should maximize the sum of all benefits, and/or
minimize the sum of all costs, that arise from pursuing government policies.
This suggests applying the law of the state that has the regulatory advantage
and/or that cares most about a particular transaction113. Because maximization
of one state’s welfare is not the same as maximization of global welfare in a
Kaldor-Hicks sense (defined as the sum of the utilities of all states), a certain
conduct may benefit the overall welfare of state A but reduce the overall
welfare of state B. Regardless of whether the conduct is efficient globally
(because the benefits outweigh the costs), state A will ceteris paribus want to
encourage the conduct and state B will want to deter it. In order to be efficient
in a Kaldor/Hicks sense, private international law rules must make sure that the
state with more to lose from application of the other law (or more to win from
application of its own) will see its law applied. This ensures that transaction
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costs between states are minimized because no further agreements between
states are necessary to reallocate jurisdiction114.
The analysis is not very different if states merely maximize their own
welfare. If the efficiency criterion is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, then the results
will not be very different from those in a private law model. Global efficiency
between state economies will then equal global efficiency between individuals.
If the relevant criterion is Pareto efficiency, a mechanism for side payments or
redistribution between states must be found. However, if the focus is on the
effectiveness of states’ policies regardless of whether they are welfareenhancing in an objective sense, the questions for private international law
become more complex. In cases that affect the policy interests of more than one
state (true conflicts), choice-of-law rules must find a way to make these rules
commensurable in order to determine which state has the greatest interest in
regulation.
The most important consideration in this model is not predictability for
parties (as in a private law model), but effectiveness of state policies115. Consequently, whereas authors in the private law model emphasize predictability
over everything, one author in the international law model prefers “muddy”
entitlements of jurisdiction116. There is a preference in the international law
model, as in the private law model, for “private” ordering. But when the actors
are states, private ordering is achieved not between individuals but between
states, through treaties117. Outside of treaties, the applicable law can then be
determined either as the result of a hypothetical bargain between states (based
on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion for efficiency) or by the forum (based on the
Pareto criterion).
This model can account for the fact that states may pursue goals other than
efficiency (domestic or global) between individuals and that these goals are
relevant for an economic analysis insofar as they determine the states’ own
preferences. Economic analysis can now be used to formalize findings of
traditional interest analysis in efficiency terms. If only one state is interested in
regulation (“false conflict”), it is efficient, under both Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks
criteria, to give jurisdiction to that state. If no state is interested (“unprovidedfor case”), it is efficient to apply the law of the forum, because this reduces
litigation costs. What if both states are interested (“true conflict”)? For
example, state A may have very lax liability rules in order to protect its
114
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producers, while state B has very strict liability rules, possibly even coupled
with punitive damages rules, to protect its own victims. Moving away from a
system in which each state applies its own law cannot be Pareto efficient,
because each state loses if the other state’s law applies. It is likewise doubtful
how a Kaldor-Hicks efficient solution can be found. The regulatory interests of
state B may not be impaired under a place-of-conduct rule if the nonapplication of its laws has no impact on the incentives for the parties. But in
most cases, the benefits to one state from application of its laws will be the
costs to another state of non-application of its laws. The criticism in the
traditional doctrine of conflicts theories such as comparative impairment or
weighing of interests118 as essentially unpredictable119 apply to attempts of
maximizing efficiency in private international law, too120. Outside an actual
agreement between states on choice of law, these policies are non-commensurable, so it will be difficult to determine which is the more efficient rule.
III. Effectuating Regulatory Advantage and Substantive Policies
“[T]he place of conduct,” O’Hara and Ribstein suggest, “arguably has a
regulatory advantage in generating conduct rules, while the place of injury and
of the parties’ domiciles might be better situated to decide issues that allocate
losses.”121 If this is true, then a place-of-conduct rule should be efficient in an
international law model. Why the place of conduct should have this regulatory
advantage, however, is not clear for an international law model. It may have an
advantage in enforcing regulations, but this is not the same as regulatory
advantage in a private international law setting. The place of conduct has better
information about the costs of care for injurers, but the place of injury has
better information about the expected injuries and about the cost of care for
victims. Optimal regulation would be achieved by cooperation between both
places, but private international law cannot bring such cooperation about.
This suggests that substantive policies may be more helpful. Which private
international law rule maximizes state interests? This depends again on whether
state interests are defined as the maximization of domestic welfare or as
something more. If social welfare is nothing more than the sum of all individuals’ costs and benefits, and if the relevant efficiency criterion is Pareto
efficiency (or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency with an effective system of side payments between states), then the result is congruent with the result from the
118
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private law model. The choice-of-law rule that is most efficient between parties
must then also be the most efficient one between states because it will create
the highest degree of global welfare, which states can then redistribute.
The situation is more complex regarding the maximization of governmental
policies. Many prefer a place-of-injury rule over a place-of-conduct rule
because they believe regulatory interests of states are directed primarily at the
regulation of markets122. This is not obvious. One might argue that the place of
conduct may have a policy of allowing certain conduct and keeping it free from
liability (provided the place or its economy benefits from it) no less strong than
the interest of the place of injury in banning the conduct or in assessing
damages for it. Regulation is not only the prevention, but also the enabling, of
conduct123. But states have a stronger interest in regulating what goes on at
home than what goes on abroad, and they have a mutual interest of applying
one and the same law to conditions in a market. Presumably, every state would
prefer to have a monopoly on the regulation of conduct that affects its own
markets rather than have a monopoly on the regulation of conduct that takes
place in its own state. The reason is that states have an interest in setting
common rules under which a national market works, and they will be better
able to regulate markets under a place-of-injury rule than under a place-ofconduct rule. This is the background for the rise of the effects doctrine in
choice of law, a variation on the place-of-injury rule124.
IV. Injunctions and Punitive Damages
Injunctions and Punitive damages are less of a problem for an international law
model than for a private law model. They are not suspect per se. Rather, a state
granting an injunction or punitive damages against certain conduct thereby
signals that it has a particularly strong policy on the desirability of this conduct.
This policy can be assumed, at least typically, to be stronger than the other
state’s policy of allowing the conduct, or even of shielding it from liability. Of
course, this is hard to know for sure – a state cannot express a preference for
allowing certain conduct through tort law more strongly than by allowing it –
but given how rare at least punitive damages are, the generalization may be
admissible. Other than a private law model that aims at avoiding injunctions

122

Cf. Peter Mankowski, Wider ein Herkunftslandprinzip für Dienstleistungen im Binnenmarkt: IPRax 24 (2004) 385; Virgós Soriano/ Garcimartín Alférez (supra note 22).
123
This point, long familiar in interest analysis, is now also made in economic analyses:
Guzman (supra note 9) 916 et seq.
124
Dieter Martiny, Die Anknüpfung an den Markt, in: Jürgen Basedow/Klaus J. Hopt/Hein
Kötz (eds.) Festschrift für Ulrich Drobnig zum 70. Geburtstag (1998) 389; Mankowski, Wider
ein Herkunftslandprinzip (supra note 122) 386.

Two Economists, Three Opinions?

29

and punitive damages, an international law model has reason to ensure that
injunctions and punitive damages become available.
In theory, both the place of the conduct and the place of the injury may have
laws granting punitive damages. However, a state’s desire to protect its own
citizens can be assumed to be stronger than its desire to punish its citizens. It is
not necessary to borrow the credo from governmental interest analysis that
states are interested only in the benefit of their own citizens to make this
assumption. Rather, the assumption is justified that states are interested rather
in the effects of conduct than in its moral desirability, and that they care more
about the effects at home than the effects abroad. It follows that the place of the
injury has a stronger interest in having its punitive damages statute applied than
does the place of the conduct, so punitive damages do not alter the preference
in the international law model for a place-of-injury rule.
V. Firms as Injurers and Competitive Markets
If, as the private law model suggests, a place-of-conduct rule favours firms
engaged in cross-border commerce and thereby enhances competition, it may
be clear why an international model would favour a place-of-injury rule. Of
course, intensified cross-border commerce should enhance the social welfare of
all states, so it should be in the interest of states as well. But this is not certain.
Under a place-of-conduct rule, victims in state B may not be able to recover for
injuries caused by an injurer in state A, while the benefits from the conduct will
all be reaped by state A. The global welfare enhancement may not be Pareto
efficient between states.
When states pursue policies other than the maximization of welfare, those
policies may well be undermined under a place-of-conduct rule. States will be
unable to enforce their policy preferences in their home markets. In addition,
states may be under pressure to make their own laws more efficient in order to
enable their own firms to compete with foreign firms that would otherwise have
a competitive advantage. Domestic producers may be forced out of business by
competitors profiting from more beneficial laws. Not surprisingly, the decline
of international commerce may be bad for individuals, for all state economies
combined, and for globalisation, but it may be good for state policies other than
the maximization of welfare. This suggests superiority of a place-of-injury rule.
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D. The Third Economic Model: Incentivising States to Pass Efficient Laws
I.

Basic Economics of Incentivising States

A variation brings both models together. This approach, here called an incentivising model, is represented (though not purely) by Andrew Guzman125. The
overall goal is again, as in the private law model, global efficiency as between
individuals, but now substantive laws are modelled as dependent variables
rather than exogenous factors. In this model it is assumed that states are
rational in the sense that they pass substantive laws that are efficient domestically, because they maximize the benefits and minimize the costs to the state’s
own economy. Domestic efficiency is not the same as global efficiency, however. States may, through the laws they pass, externalize costs to other states’
economies126. Such costs do not appear in the cost-benefit analysis of the state’s
domestic efficiency analysis.
Whether states can thus externalize the costs of their substantive laws is, at
least in part, a matter of private international law. Private international law
rules are efficient in such a model if they give incentives to states to pass rules
that in turn maximize overall efficiency as between individuals. In addition to
the state-state relation reflected in the state-based model, and the individualindividual level reflected in the individual-based model, this model accounts
for the state-individual relation.
The model is closely related to analyses of regulatory competition. Like
regulatory competition analysis, the incentivising model sees states under external pressure to pass efficient laws. Unlike in regulatory competition, however,
this pressure comes not from the competition of other states, but rather from the
pressure of private international law rules to internalise costs. Traditional
analyses of regulatory competition, if they focus on private international law at
all, typically emphasize party autonomy as a tool for competition because it is a
cheaper tool for exit than physical relocation. But party autonomy is
insufficient for three reasons. First, it may not be available in all circumstances.
Tort law is one example: parties will frequently not be able to agree ex ante on
the applicable law. Second, party autonomy may not always lead to
applicability of the most efficient law because parties have no interest in taking
third-party externalities into account. Third, it is still unclear whether states
actually have an incentive to improve their laws in the light of party
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autonomy 127. States may in fact have fewer incentives to change their laws if
parties can simply opt out of them128.
II. Consequences for Private International Law
What does this mean for the design of private international law rules? Using a
bit of game theory, the analysis can be modelled as a three-stage game. In the
first stage, a hypothetical global lawmaker passes its private international law
rules. In a second stage, states react to these rules when they pass their
substantive law rules. In a third stage, finally, the parties adapt their conduct to
the incentives set by the combination of substantive laws and private
international law rules. In passing their substantive laws, states must have in
mind both the applicable private international law rules and the predicted
conduct of individuals. The hypothetical private international law lawmaker, in
turn, must be able to predict how states will react to different rules of private
international law. Private international law rules are efficient if they give states
the incentives to pass substantive laws that in turn give individuals the right
incentives for efficient conduct. This may show why this model is a combination of the first two. Like the private law model, it looks at individuals and
their utilities to determine efficiency. Like the international law model, it looks
at states as the relevant actors whose conduct must be coordinated.
It must be noted that the incentives set by private international law rules for
states and their substantive laws are frequently negligible, especially in the
realm of tort law. If a state’s substantive laws affect predominantly that state’s
own economy, then the state internalises most costs and benefits from its laws
regardless of the private international law situation. The same applies if a
state’s economy consists of roughly similar numbers of injurers and victims.
Whether a private international law rule benefits injurers and hurts victims or
vice versa is then equivalent to that state. The model becomes relevant,
however, when states are small, so a majority of interactions is international. It
becomes relevant also when great differences between the relation of injurers to
victims exist between economies. For example, one state may have lots of
plants that cause pollution, while another state has lots of farmers whose crops
suffer from the pollution. Or, one state is situated upstream, another
downstream, so the pollution caused by plants in the first state will affect the
second state, but not the other way round.
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III. Incentivising Efficient Substantive Laws
Assume that the conduct takes place in state A, while a variable portion of the
injuries take place in state B. Assume further that the injurer is a domiciliary of
state A and that all benefits from his conduct are similarly benefits to the
economy of state A, while the injuries in state B are injuries of citizens (voters
and taxpayers) of B. In this situation, all social benefits from the conduct flow
to the economy of state A. It is now possible to see how the model plays out for
unilateral and for bilateral accidents. Starting with unilateral accidents, assume
first that only injurers can prevent accidents and that states can adopt the
following liability regimes129: (1) no liability, (2) negligence with differing
levels of required care, and (3) strict liability. Assume that all injurers are
situated in state A. Thus state A has the injurer and possibly a number of
victims, while state B has only victims. The states are likely to adopt liability
regimes that will maximize domestic social welfare. State B will reap no
benefits from the conduct (because the conduct takes place in state A), while
suffering all costs from the injuries to citizens of state B, minus the amount that
its citizens can claim from the injurers. State A, on the other hand, will reap all
benefits from the injurer’s conduct and suffer all the costs due to injuries to its
own domiciliaries, plus the costs arising from damages paid to state B
domiciliaries for their injuries. (Whether victims in state A are compensated or
not is irrelevant for efficiency because this concerns only redistribution within
state A’s economy.) The factors determining social welfare in state A and in
state B are thus quite different. Moreover, the choice-of-law rule will have an
effect not only on the incentives of individual parties but also on the domestic
economies of the states. Whereas, for example, an injurer may face similar
incentives in a system of strict liability as in a system of negligence, his state’s
economy does not, because a system of strict liability means that more money
will pass to another state than under a system of negligence. Consequently,
although the state would be indifferent as between a system of negligence and
one of strict liability in a purely local economy, it will not be indifferent for
transnational activities.
What is the impact of different choice-of-law rules on liability regimes for
unilateral accidents? Assume, first, a purely domestic case: all injuries occur in
state A, none in state B. In this case, the law of state A is both the law of the
conduct and the law of the effects. Under neither rule will the law of state B
ever apply. State A’s rule is irrelevant to state B, there are no incentives for B’s
substantive law either way. On the other hand, state A has an incentive to adopt
an efficient liability regime, because its economy will bear all costs from the

129

This means in particular that the state can neither enjoin certain conduct altogether nor
assign punitive damages.

Two Economists, Three Opinions?

33

conduct. Not surprisingly, for purely domestic cases the choice-of-law rule is
irrelevant.
Now assume that all injuries are felt in state B. Now the injury costs are
borne by state B and the costs of care are borne by state A. Under a place-ofconduct rule, state B has no incentives either way (because its laws will be
inapplicable), while state A’s incentive is to pass a no-liability regime because
any costs from such care are not outweighed by any benefits to the state
economy. Under a place-of-injury rule, state A has no incentives to pass any
laws while state B will adopt a strict liability regime. What will the injurer’s
conduct be under either of these two regimes – the law of the place of conduct,
or the law of the place of accident? Under a place-of-conduct rule, he will not
exercise any care because he will not be liable for any damages. Under a placeof-injury rule, on the other hand, he will internalise all costs of his conduct, and
so will take the globally optimal level of care. Clearly, in this context, the law
of the place of the injury is superior. Just as strict liability between individuals
forces the injurers to internalise all costs, so a place-of-injury rule for choice of
law forces the economy of the state of conduct to internalise all costs of conduct by its citizens.
However, many activities cause injuries both in the state of the conduct and
in other states. Assume that some of the injuries are felt in state A, and some
are felt in state B. Again, state B has no incentives under a place-of-conduct
regime, while it will opt for a strict liability regime under a place-of-injury rule
because its interests are still similar to those of the victims, and this enables its
victims to recover for all their accidents. State A, on the other hand, is more
interesting. Because state A reaps all benefits and bears all of the costs of care
but only half of the injury costs, the locally optimal level of care will be lower
than the globally optimal level of care. Under a place-of-injury regime, state A
will be indifferent as between a strict liability rule and a negligence rule. Under
a place-of-conduct regime, on the other hand, state A will adopt a negligence
regime and set the due level of care so that the marginal costs of care equal the
marginal reduction of injury losses in state A, regardless of those in state B.
This level will be lower than the globally optimal level of care, because state A
receives all benefits from a reduction of care from the globally optimal level,
while suffering only some of the losses, namely those to its own domiciliaries.
Whenever more than half of the injuries occur in state A, any decrease in the
level of care will hurt domestic social welfare in state A more than it reduces
costs in state B.
This analysis thus far leads to these conclusions: the law of the place of
injury is always globally superior to the law of the place of conduct if some of
the injury occurs outside the state of conduct (otherwise it is equally efficient).
It is globally efficient if 100% of the injury takes place outside the state of
conduct, or if 100% of the injury occurs inside the state of conduct, provided
states cannot have stricter liability regimes than strict liability. If some of the
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injury occurs in the state of conduct and some in the state of injury, a place-ofinjury rule does not lead to optimal results but is still superior.
How do bilateral accidents change this picture? Again, three scenarios are
possible. First, if all injuries occur in state A, that state has an incentive to pass
optimal liability rules that give optimal incentives to both plaintiffs and defendants. In this situation, a strict liability regime without a defence of comparative
or contributory negligence is inefficient; it induces victims to take no care at
all, even when the costs of such care would be more than outweighed by the
reduction to the overall risk. A negligence regime is efficient because victims
must assume that the injurer will take no more than due care, so they will take
some care themselves. Similarly efficient is a strict liability regime or a negligence regime together with a rule for contributory or comparative negligence.130 The content of the law of state B is irrelevant and will not depend on
the choice-of-law rules.
However, this result changes when all injury occurs in state B. Because state
B does not profit from expenditures on care by its citizens (the victims), the law
of state B will provide for strict liability without the defence of comparative or
contributory negligence if its law is applicable under a place-of-injury rule.
State A, on the other hand, has an incentive to adopt a no-liability regime
because the conduct causes no harm at all within its economy under a place-ofconduct rule. In this case, neither a place-of-conduct rule nor a place-of-injury
rule leads to efficient incentives for both parties. To determine which of them is
superior would require knowing whether strict liability without defence or no
liability is the more efficient liability rule. This in turn depends on whether
injurers or victims are the cheaper risk-avoiders – a plausible criterion for
substantive law rules, but unattractive for a choice-of-law rule.
The most interesting scenario is again the third one, in which some of the
injuries occur in state A and some in state B. Under a place-of-conduct rule,
state A will have a rule of negligence together with a rule on comparative or
contributory negligence. The due level of care for the injurer will be too low
from a global level; as a consequence the due level of care for the victim will
be too high. Under a place-of-injury rule, state A also has an incentive to adopt
a regime providing for negligence and comparative or contributory negligence.
The only difference is that no costs can be reduced with respect to victims in
state B, so the divergence from the global optimum will be less extreme. State
B, on the other hand, will still have a liability regime granting strict liability
with no contributory negligence, regardless of how many of the injuries occur
in state B under a place-of-injury rule. This choice-of-law rule is inefficient. It
gives victims in state B no incentive to exercise any care at all. At the same
time, victims in state A will have an incentive to exercise a high level of care in
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order to avoid accidents if they expect the injurer to take too little care. How
much care the injurer will take depends on the circumstances.
IV. Injunctions and Punitive Damages
Thus far, the place of the injury may seem more efficient. One important reason
for this is, however, that under the assumptions, state B cannot seriously overregulate, as it has a choice only between strict liability and negligence regimes.
This changes once injunctions and punitive damages are options.
Normally, punitive damages are considered inefficient except in two situations: if injurers are likely to escape some liability, and (controversially)131 if
certain conduct is thought generally socially undesirable regardless of whether
it brings individual benefits. Both these situations, rare in the domestic context,
may appear frequently in the cross-border tort situation from the perspective of
one state. First, if injurers comply with the requirements of the laxer of two
laws, they escape some liability under the harsher of the two, and the legislators
of the latter may use punitive damages to set optimal deterrence. Second, from
the perspective of one state, conduct that is globally efficient may be deemed
socially undesirable because the benefits it produces arise outside that state.
If state A underregulates, punitive damages can thus well lead to optimal
incentives, provided they are set at the right level. The problem is that state B
has no incentive to restrict injunctions and punitive damages in this way.
Because state B does not at all benefit from the conduct, it may be thought to
have an incentive to grant injunctions more freely, and to grant punitive
damages at higher levels than the globally optimal level. This would make a
place-of-injury rule inefficient, because that rule would enable state B to
prevent efficiency-enhancing conduct. This is the intuition behind opposition to
extraterritorial regulation132. But this opposition frequently focuses only on
public regulation by way of banning certain conduct altogether. Injunctions and
punitive damages give states more flexible tools.
However, the complete banning of foreign punitive damages can be both
over-inclusive and under-inclusive. It can be over-inclusive insofar as it bans
punitive damages that would be globally beneficial. The rule can be underinclusive insofar as it focuses only on foreign, not domestic, punitive damages.
If the courts of the place of the injury adjudicate litigation between victims
from the forum state and the injurer, they would not have any reason, under
choice of law, not to apply their own law’s super-punitive damages rule. The
131
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risk of such litigation might deter the injurer from his conduct altogether,
although the conduct can be globally efficient. What would be needed,
therefore, is a multilateral choice-of-law rule that restricts punitive damages at
an appropriate level, but does so for all international transactions, regardless of
the forum.
If transaction costs between injurers and victims are sufficiently low, victims
will trade their right to an injunction or to punitive damages for a compensation
higher than their actual injuries. If transaction costs are prohibitively high, then
such a transaction will not take place. In this case, injunctions and punitive
damages at a high level are inefficient, because they prevent efficient conduct
from taking place. This makes it irrational for state B to pass such rules. True,
by passing these rules, state B prevents conduct that leads to injuries to its own
citizens, but by preventing beneficial conduct, state B also prevents its own
citizens from partaking in the benefits from the conduct. It is more rational for
state B to avoid injunctions, and to set punitive damages lower than the
expected benefits to the injurer. This ensures that the conduct is still beneficial
to the injurer so it takes place and victims can recover more than their actual
injuries. Again, all that happens is redistribution. No inefficient conduct is
prevented.
It follows that a place-of-injury rule can still be efficient. State B has an
interest in passing laws that transfer as much of the benefit from the conduct to
its own citizens, but it has no interest in preventing that conduct from
happening altogether.
V. Firms as Injurers and Competitive Markets
The analysis changes once firms as injurers and competitive markets are taken
into account. This is where the frequent fears for a race to the bottom become
relevant. This is not the place to repeat the whole debate on regulatory
competition, and to discuss whether it leads to a race to the bottom, a race to
the top, or something in between. However, it is useful to see how the debate
can be linked with the incentivising model.
We have seen that a place-of-conduct rule would enable producers from state
A to produce at lower costs, because state A would shield them from liability to
victims in its own state. State A’s lax tort law functions as a subsidy to its own
producers. As a consequence, they may be able to offer their products in state B
at a lower price than producers from state B, thereby putting the latter at a
competitive disadvantage. Consumers in state B benefit from the reduced
prices, but state B’s economy at large may well suffer, because the losses to its
producers are greater than the benefits to its consumers. In such a case, state B
cannot react with stricter regulations for producers from state A, because its
laws are not applicable. Its only possible reaction is to lower the restrictions to
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its own producers, by relaxing its own tort law, to keep producers from state B
competitive133.
A place of injury rule, by contrast, gives state B an incentive to overregulate.
The reason is that victims in state B receive all benefits from over-regulation
(which puts them at a superior bargaining position vis-à-vis injurers), while it
bears only some of the costs: precaution costs must be borne by injurers in both
state B and in state A. State A on the other hand still has an incentive to
underregulate. It depends on the ratio of victims in both states, whether the
under-regulation in state A can outweigh the effects of over-regulation in state
B. Since producers face less liability costs to victims in their home states, they
are still able to offer their products at lower prices in state B than producers
from state B.
Whether a place-of-injury or a place-of-conduct rule is more efficient,
cannot be decided in this model. One leads to under-regulation, the other to
over-regulation134.
E. Analysis
I.

Results

The original suspicion has been verified. Two economists – or rather, two
economic paradigms, one based on individual interests, the other on state
interests – indeed lead to three models that in turn create three different
opinions. A private law model supports a place-of-conduct rule in order to
empower markets, while an international law model supports a place-of-injury
rule in order to maintain state policies. (The dispute between the European
Union, favouring a country-of-origin rule, and the member states, favouring a
place-of-injury rule, can thus easily be explained – the member states are afraid
of losing influence, while the Union is interested in creating the common
market135.) An incentivising model finally stands in the middle of the two; it
has a weak preference for place-of-injury rules for liability regimes, but not for
damages.
This result suggests that the discrepancy in traditional private international
law between private and international law concepts is replicated in the
discrepancy between private and international models in economic analysis.
The private law model favours a place-of-conduct rule because it enhances
competition and reduces the impact of state policies; the international law
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model favours a place-of-injury rule because it enables states to regulate their
own markets and protect domestic firms from foreign competition. The discrepancy can be made more general: the economic private law model leads to
results favoured by private law conceptions in doctrine: hard and fast rules,
preference for party autonomy, preference for free markets over protective state
policies, and regulatory competition. The economic international law model, by
contrast, leads to results favoured by international law conceptions in the
doctrine, especially governmental interest analysis: discretionary principles,
only limited use of party autonomy, preference for protective state policies over
free markets, and cooperation between states and comity.
The differences are not surprising; they are functions of the different
assumptions underlying the models. A private law model aims at avoiding
inefficient substantive laws; an international law model protects them as embodying the preferences of states as rational actors. Authors writing in a private
law model assume that the risk of third-party externalities from party autonomy
is smaller than the public choice risk from inefficient mandatory laws. Authors
in an international law model, on the other hand, seem to assume that the public
choice risks are smaller than the risks coming from parties undermining state
policies. In a private law model, Kaldor-Hicks provides a relatively uncontested
criterion for global efficiency; in an international law model, Pareto efficiency
is better able to account for sovereignty and the lack of a system for side
payments between states. If the public/private distinction is seen as a struggle
between states on the one hand and individuals on the other, it is not surprising
that a model that focuses only on individuals as actors will enable individuals
to avoid constraints from states, whereas a model which focuses only on states
as actors will enable states to constrain individuals.
II. The Choice between the Models
Can the models be reconciled? One may think that different models are simply
appropriate for different areas of the law. Indeed, authors in the private law
model focus on the classical areas of private law: contracts, “everyday” torts,
property, etc136. They seem to assume that in areas like contract law, countries
pursue fewer regulatory goals, and because each system has equal numbers,
e.g., of sellers and buyers, all rules are likely to be neutral between the two
groups and therefore presumably more or less efficient. As a consequence, the
content of the rules plays a much less important role than clarity and
predictability, and differences between legal systems, if they exist at all, are
considered irrelevant for interpersonal efficiency. If there are policy differences, the problem is not national preferences but rather problems of public
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choice, which can be overcome through regulatory competition. On the other
hand, authors in the international law and in the incentivising model focus on
regulatory areas of the law like antitrust and securities regulations137, traditional
areas of public law. Here the assumption is that the content of the substantive
rules of different states and states’ freedom to determine such policies, play a
great role. States actually pursue economic strategies depending on the strength
of their industries, and legal regimes are very different because different
economies may have significantly more exporters or more importers, so
substantive rules are likely to be twisted in favour of one group or the other. It
might then follow that the models are not really in conflict but rather apply to
different areas of the law, private law on the one side and public law on the
other. Such a distinction would mirror the traditional distinction, more prominent in Europe than in the United States, between relatively technical and
apolitical private international law on the one hand, and the more political
question of extraterritorial applicability of public law.
Or perhaps the relationship between the two models is one of rule and
exception. Indeed, neither the private law nor the international law model is
seen as exclusive; both allow for the other model. Thus O’Hara and Ribstein
leave an exception from the private law model for public law matters,
especially criminal law138. And Trachtman allows an exception from the
international law model for areas with no or with attenuated governmental preferences139. These relations of rule and exceptions reflect differences in traditional private international law. Savigny, who could be considered the ancestor
of individual-based approaches, wrote for a legal environment in which
different countries had structurally very different legal systems, yet largely
agreed on the apolitical substance of private law. Consequently, a main task of
private international law was a question of technical coordination. Indeed,
Savigny’s approach assumed the equivalence and gradual convergence of legal
systems in the Western world were equivalent. Where this was not the case, his
system had to allow for exceptions. Brainerd Currie, on the other hand, perhaps
the extreme proponent of an international law approach, was confronted with a
legal landscape in which different states of the United States have similar
methodologies but differences in individual rules, and these differences are
often inspired by political differences. In the American system, almost every
difference between laws represents a difference in regulatory policies.140 Where
policies are (exceptionally) similar, Currie sees no true conflict of laws and
considers the solution a largely technical matter. In this sense, the difference
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between Savigny and Currie concerns mainly the relation between rule and
exception: the rule for one is the exception for the other, and vice versa.
Yet the problem for compromise is that the boundary must be drawn
somewhere, and it is difficult to devise objective criteria as to where it should
be drawn. Tort law is a good example: is it primarily private law, so a private
law model should prevail? This argument succeeds when tertiary costs are high
and regulatory interests, including incentives to parties, are low, for example,
because no significant differences between different laws exist. Or is it primarily public law, so an international law model should prevail? This would be
the case when states pursue strong regulatory interests with their laws, possibly
in explicit opposition to the laws of other states. But what if both come
together?
The greatest hope seems to lies with the third model, the incentivising states
model. That model is the only one that does not replicate a traditional approach
to private international law, because traditional doctrine usually considers
substantive laws as given. Here, law and economics might have something new
and original to contribute to the debate on private international law. The
problem is that the model has a very restricted scope of application. It becomes
relevant only where injurers are predominantly situated in one state, while
victims are predominantly situated in the other state. Only in these situations do
internal and global efficiency differ, so states have an incentive to pass statutes
that are efficient for their own economy but not efficient globally. While
Guzman seems to think of this as the standard case141, in reality it is a relatively
rare case. The wide variety of cases in which states simply pursue different
policies that they deem appropriate for their own societies cannot be resolved
with this model.
If therefore the incentivising model is no full alternative, and if no metamodel exists to decide the conflict between the private international law
models, the boundary must be taken from one of the two models. Indeed, each
model provides for a definition of the boundary. Trachtman wants to draw the
border from the side of the state. For him all law is “public law”, and “[t]he
proper distinction to draw is not between private and public law, but in the
degree to which law implicates state preferences.”142 Whincop and Keyes, on
the other hand, draw the boundary from the side of private parties when they
emphasize the need for party autonomy precisely as a tool to avoid inefficient
state preferences and deny it only in order to avoid negative externalities143.
Obviously, these boundaries differ from each other. We end up with a new
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(true!) conflict, that between international and private, between state and
individual, and the neutral conflicts rule to resolve it is nowhere to be found.
III. The Promises and Limits of Economics
The choice of a model, though not per se determinative for the result,
determines the relative strength and weakness of arguments. For example, a
private law model may emphasize regulatory competition, while an
international law model may emphasize cooperation between states. For a
private law model, mandatory norms represent inefficient results of public
choice problems, for an international law model they represent emanations of
sovereignty. None of these assumptions is intrinsic to the models: cooperation
can be justified in a private law model, and regulatory competition can be
justified in an international law model; democratic legitimacy can be
reconceived as the result of private bargains, inefficient norms can be
reconceived as improper. But the choice of one model over the other brings
with it a certain baggage of preconceptions that allow focusing on some aspects
in an economic analysis while dismissing others as irrelevant. The choice of the
appropriate model is the crucial step.
Yet the analysis suggests that economic analysis cannot resolve the
important underlying policy questions in private international law through an
efficiency analysis. Economic analysis can tell us what is efficient within one
model, but it then needs to make certain assumptions about which costs should
be taken into account and which costs should not matter. Economic analysis
can tell us which model to use for which areas of the law, but it cannot draw the
boundary or tell us what belongs into which area. If one tries to overcome these
problems by incorporating everything, economic analysis becomes inconclusive. Through and through, the public/private distinction that the economic
analysis aims at overcoming comes back to haunt it.
This does not mean that economic analysis has no role to play in private
international law. First, the economic analysis provides a useful heuristic on
private international law, both on the importance of deciding for one or the
other model, and on the plausibility of arguments within each model. In fact,
rephrasing private international law debates in economic terms reveals more
sharply the underlying political conflicts within the discipline of private
international law. Second, economic analysis provides tools for a much more
rigorous analysis of the impact that rules of private international law have on
the conduct of individuals and of states. Economic analysis can show that
private international law is neither merely a neutral technical meta-law that
designates the applicable law according to some transcendent criterion, nor that
it incorporates only ex-post (or even ex-ante) justice. Rather, private international law plays an active role in the regulation of international transactions
not unlike that of substantive law. And economic analysis can enable us to
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quantify the incentives of choice-of-law rules and set them into relation with
conflicting incentives.
These insights should all be used for a more informed analysis of private
international law rules. They should not be used, however, to replace the vain
hope for a neutral and objective private international law with the equally vain
hope for a neutral and objective economic analysis, to replace the elusive
notion of “conflicts justice” with the equally ambiguous notion of “global
efficiency”. Before strong normative claims of efficiency can be made,
economic analysis should be used for the more modest task of positively
analysing the effects that different choice-of-law regimes will have, and leave
normative decisions to the political process. The choice of one or the other
model is not an ad hoc decision but ultimately a political decision. As a consequence, it does not help much to present the results of an efficiency analysis
as scientifically proven normative conclusions, if the choice for the model itself
has been made on an ad hoc basis. Rather, the results from the models should
be used to enlighten us as to which model is more attractive for one situation or
the other. Once the regulatory force of private international law is realized, it
becomes clear that the ultimately political debates about the goals of regulation
cannot remain in the sphere of substantive law or at the level of the state, but
rather must be taken up at the level of private international law and at the level
of global society as well. Law and economics can guide us towards better
regulation, but the ultimate decisions must be taken elsewhere.

